Machan's vision of natural rights rests on ethical egoism's
view that human beings ought to pursue their flourishing and
happiness. He observes that natural rights are determined by
the fact that a person is a human being who has morally
chosen to pursue a good and happy social and political life.
From the fact of one's moral responsibility to live a
flourishing life and from one's choice to do so in a social
context, it follows that he is obligated to respect others'
rights. He must do this in order to fulfill his initially
chosen responsibility to develop himself to the fullest
extent as dictated by his human nature and his individual
facticity.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl
agree with Machan that, based on the nature of man and the
world, certain natural rights can be identified and an
appropriate political order can be instituted. Rasmussen and
Den Uyl base their view of natural rights as metanormative
principles on the universal characteristics of human nature
that call for the protection and preservation of the
possibility of self-directedness in society regardless of
the situation. Because they do not base natural rights on
human flourishing, they believe they have formulated a
strong argument for a non-perfectionist and non-moralistic
minimal-state politics.
Machan, on the other
hand, bases his argument for natural rights as normative
principles on the premise that the moral task of each person
is his flourishing as a human being and as the unique
individual that he is. For him, rights are moral principles
which apply to people within a social context and which are
protected by the minimal state.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl see
a problem in putting what Machan has called a moral
principle (i.e., natural rights) as the subject of political
action or control. Their goal is to abandon the idea that
politics is institutionalized ethics. They say that
statecraft is not soulcraft and that politics is not
appropriate to make men moral. Although Rasmussen and Den
Uyl and Machan have addressed the idea of natural rights
from different directions and perspectives, they have
supplied us with two excellent derivations of the powerful
idea of natural rights.
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