A
Canada Post expert from Carleton University
reports that the original postal monopoly was created in England in 1635,
when Charles I decided it would help him spy on communications while benefiting
the public purse. The deposed monarch’s legacy remains with us today in the
Canada Post Corporation Act, which, subject to certain exceptions,
grants the entity “the sole and exclusive privilege of collecting,
transmitting and delivering letters to the addressee thereof within Canada.”
Over time, that privilege
has been eroded. Courier services opened up the high-end market, relying on an
exception for “letters of an urgent nature that are transmitted by a messenger.”
They cannot compete with regular mail, however, since by law they must charge at
least triple Canada Post’s rate for letters weighing 50 grams,
currently $1.03.
Such competition pales,
of course, in comparison to the impact of the Internet and electronic commerce
on the low end of Canada Post’s business. Catalogues, bills, greeting cards,
letters, magazines and any number of documents no longer need to be delivered in
physical form. Even as new addresses increase by 200,000 annually (an average
jump of about 1.5%), Canada Post’s letter mail volumes have decreased by 17%
over the past five years, falling by almost 200 million pieces
from 2008 to 2009 alone. Average volume per address dipped 13% between 2005
and 2009, from 377 pieces of mail annually
to 334.
These trends are unlikely
to reverse; regular mail revenues dropped for each of the last four years
preceding Canada Post’s
last annual report in 2009. A promising alternative revenue stream is direct
marketing, whose strong growth from 2005 to 2008 brought it from 17% of Canada
Post’s revenues to 18.5% (this figure dropped somewhat in 2009 due to the
recession). Then again, Canada Post probably does not aspire to being a state-owned
junk mail delivery system.
Current
circumstances are crying out for change. Everything from Canada Post’s cost
structure to its very business model merits further scrutiny.
Fix the workforce
An obvious place to start is Canada Post’s under-producing labour force. In
2005, its average full-time employee missed 16 days of work, 60% more than the
average manufacturing employee and 20% more than the average unionized worker.
The portion of its employees on modified duties is estimated to be up to five
times the industry average. In 2004, Canada Post workers were estimated to have
worked less than 64% of their actual paid time, or
10% less than other unionized employees. These numbers come with a price
tag: in 2008, 64% of Canada Post’s revenues went to its labour costs. This
figure was 15 to 20 percentage points higher than the equivalent figures for
Australia, New Zealand, Sweden and Austria. (Only the US Postal Service
was significantly higher.)
As expensive as Canada
Post’s labour force is today, it may be an even heavier financial burden
tomorrow. Under its current “defined benefit” pension plan, workers receive a
pre-determined amount upon retirement. While it is an employee’s dream, it is
highly risky for the employer, who must make up the difference if contributions
plus return on investment are insufficient to pay the amount owed.
Defined benefit plans
face large shortfalls
across the Western world. For example, the pension funds of the London Stock
Exchange’s 350 largest corporations face a collective shortfall of
£109 billion. An employer that grants its workers a guaranteed benefit upon
retirement must be confident that its cash flow will cover any deficiency
without soaking up its working capital. Unsurprisingly, 88% of US public-sector
workers have hit the defined benefit jackpot. After all, when “management” is
short of funds, it simply confiscates them from taxpayers. Conversely, only 32%
of American large- and medium-sized employers are willing to bet their
businesses on such plans, and for good reason: heavy pension liabilities helped
push companies such as
Nortel and
General Motors Canada into bankruptcy.
Canada Post’s pension
plan reports a deficit of $2 billion to $3.2 billion, depending on how its
assets are calculated. Nonetheless, CUPW refuses to countenance any changes,
whether for
current or future employees – and since Canada Post is publicly-owned,
taxpayers will inevitably be on the hook for any shortfall. Then again, as the
GM and
Nortel bailouts show, maybe “private” pensions are a relic of the past.
The upshot is that either
CUPW makes significant concessions, or taxpayers will probably have to dish out
billions to pay for retirement benefits that are, for the most part, more
generous than their own. Of course, while management has acknowledged the need
to address the problem, being a Crown corporation whose debt has an implicit
guarantee from the public purse certainly relieves some of the pressure to find
a solution.
|