Unlike an individual
human, a collective of any sort cannot, qua
collective, breathe, eat, move, or perform any
unitary action. To say that a collective can “act”
is a misleading figure of speech. Such an “action”
can be no more than an aggregation of the extremely
disparate and individually motivated actions of a
group’s members or participants. The relationships
among a group’s members can be quite sophisticated,
it is true, but they do not supersede – in terms of
either their existence or their moral worth – the
essential, indivisible, and indissoluble
individualities of the participants.
That brings us to the
substance of the disagreement. Mr. Joseph seems to
infer that Rand’s individualism is incompatible with
relationships within the family – such as the care
for parents and children – or within a neighborhood
– such as local mutual-aid societies or groups of
volunteers. I do not see any reason why such
incompatibility need be the case. The exchange of
values can readily occur in these circumstances,
even in the absence of formal legal contracts or
direct exchanges of money. Values are far broader
than money and can consist of intangible goods and
services – such as friendship, intellectual
improvement, esthetic enjoyment, and even love (see
my essay “A
Rational View of Love” for a detailed
discussion). The key principle governing such
relationships, to the extent that they are
beneficial, is that they should be based on mutual
consent as much as possible. Even in cases where
full informed consent cannot be given – as with
children, pets, or senile elders – consent should be
sought to the extent that a living creature is
capable of exercising it non-destructively, and a
presumption must always exist that a dependent
creature would act in a life-preserving and life-enhancing
manner if it had greater knowledge and ability to do
so.
A respect for the
principle of consent in relationships of dependency
would imply, for instance, that children should not
be forced to accept styles of clothing which they
detest or espouse opinions which they do not
personally hold through their own conviction; that
pets should not be humiliated or restrained from
non-destructive inclinations; and that elders should
not be infantilized and should be empowered to
manage their own affairs to every extent their
physical faculties (in combination with technology)
permit.
What Rand detested, and
what many individualists likewise abhor, is the idea
of top-down or compulsory “community” – of
the sort that tries to deliberately (inevitably,
through the wishes of some central planner or
committee thereof) herd people into artificially
constructed relationships for the purpose of
building “togetherness” (or some comparably
disingenuous justification). Compulsory national
“service” – be it military or civilian – is the
prime example of such exploitation of individuals in
order to fulfill the power ambitious of the elites
creating the “communities” of cannon fodder or work
drones.
Additionally, a
misguided perception of the purpose of societal
interactions can lead to good people being subverted
and shackled by their moral lessers. A misperceived
sense of the value of “community” for its own sake (apart
from any values for the individuals involved) could
lead to the persistence of abuse within families;
the continual funding of corrupt, dysfunctional, and
even perverse churches or other civic organizations
due to ingrained guilt or a sense of disembodied
obligation among the contributors; the tolerance of
incompetent “old boys’ networks” running local
governments, because they are part of the “social
fabric” and a deference to tradition prevents their
being supplanted by a meritocracy. This kind of
perverse communitarianism is a prime example of what
Rand called “the sanction of the victim” – as it
cannot thrive without the endorsement and
participation of the good people who create
resources upon which the abusers and parasites prey. In even worse times and places, the willingness to
accept communities over and above individuals has
led to thoughtless conformity about the desirability
of harming individuals perceived as being
“other” or “outside” of the community – persons of
different skin colors, national origins, religions,
peaceful lifestyles, or peaceful political
persuasions. The vicious tribalist impulse is still
strong in all too many humans, and it should not be
stoked.
A misguided
communitarianism has already resulted in the
mangling of the first two decades of most Americans’
lives in the form of compulsory “public” schooling –
where academic learning takes second stage to
“socializing” the students with one another, which
typically means that the best of them will be
mercilessly bullied by the worst, while the rest
lose themselves in pointless fads and clique
rivalries. The travesty of compulsory public
schooling serves as a prominent demonstration that –
while Mr. Joseph seeks to posit an opposition
between the Leviathan and communitarianism – the two
go hand-in-hand more often than not. The Leviathan
often employs communitarian rhetoric while
representing itself as the entity that gets to
define and structure the “community” in question.
Are we dependent on
other people for much of what is good in life?
Certainly! But this, far from requiring a
communitarian viewpoint, is actually the implication
of a consistent individualism. No one person can
know everything or learn to do everything. In order
for each of us to maximize our well-being, we need
to specialize in some activities while relegating
the rest to our fellow humans – with whom we then
exchange the fruits of our respective labor. In a
market economy based on the principle of
individualism, each of us literally depends on the
efforts of millions of others to produce the goods
and services we daily enjoy. Truly sustainable
economies and societies – ones that operate without
degenerating into violence or mass poverty – require
that we treat others with the respect needed to
facilitate these ongoing transactions. With a small
circle of these individuals, we are able to form
even closer ties, where formal transactions are not
required to maintain ongoing value-trades. In a
household, for instance, it is simply more efficient
to keep a rough mental picture of other
participants’ contributions, rather than itemizing
everything in minute detail. Furthermore, the
ability to closely trust others in one’s family
(provided that it is a good one, without abuse,
deception, or exploitation) eliminates the need for
most of the typical safeguards of commerce among
strangers. Similarly, a custom of volunteer work in
one’s neighborhood might result in the capture of
certain “positive externalities” – such as the
benefits of cleaner streets, happier (and therefore
more productive and peaceful) residents, and lower
rates of vandalism and other crimes.
Perhaps Ayn Rand’s
individualism, properly understood, would allow for
precisely the ideal sense of the “natural community”
that Mr. Joseph extols – one in which individuals
engage in a variety of interactions (many of them
non-monetary) to mutual benefit and thereby develop
strong ties. Unfortunately, in practice, the
explicit idealization of the “community” has not
been an effective way of achieving such an outcome.
It has, indeed, resulted in the very opposite: an
insidious and manipulative elite, or a conformist
and prejudiced majority (often incited by that same
elite), limiting the freedoms and sometimes ruining
the lives of those who wish to use their rational
faculties to find a better way.
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