Ten Years On: A Look Back at the Iraq War |
“My fellow
citizens, at this hour American and coalition forces are in the early
stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to
defend the world from grave danger.” — President George W. Bush, March
19, 2003
With those words began the
greatest folly of our times: the invasion of Iraq. A three-week campaign
to take Baghdad later gave way to a decade-long occupation in which the
US spilled unthinkable amounts of blood and treasure in an utterly
pointless conflict. So catastrophic has been the war that it is
impossible to count the ways, but its anniversary demands sober
reflection to ponder what lessons might be learned.
Lesson #1: Be Skeptical
“Simply stated, there is no doubt
that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.” —
Vice-President Dick Cheney, August 26, 2002
In October 2002, the CIA prepared a
National Intelligence Estimate – a document that represents the
organization’s “most
authoritative written judgment concerning a national security issue.”
It asserted with “high confidence” that Baghdad was “continuing, and in
some ways expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile
programs,” that Saddam Hussein’s regime “already possesses proscribed
chemical biological weapons and missiles” and that an Iraqi nuclear
weapon was “months to a year” away. This assessment turned out to be
completely inaccurate in every way.
As it transpired, these weighty judgements – so heavy with terrible
consequences for so many innocent people – were based on little more
than fluff. The inevitable
commission of inquiry found that “almost every organization in the
Intelligence Community … performed poorly on Iraq.” The organization
supposedly expert in such matters mistook aluminum tubes used for
rockets for components of nuclear centrifuges. This misjudgment became
the chief basis for the claim that Iraq was pursuing atomic weapons.
Other intelligence streams on Iraq’s fictional nuclear program were
“very thin,” while documents purporting to show uranium purchases from
Niger were “transparently forged.” As for Iraq’s supposed biological
weapons, “virtually all” of the intelligence on them came from a single,
known liar with whom the Americans never spoke and whose claims they
failed “even to attempt to validate.” Intelligence on the mythical Iraqi
chemical weapons program was no better, relying on flawed analysis and
low-quality information.
President Bush, not a man generally given to introspection, later
admitted that this “intelligence
failure” was the
greatest regret of his tenure. If it was indeed a mistake, it was a
breathtakingly colossal one. Of course, given the yawning chasm between
allegations and reality, many argue that there was no intelligence
failure in Iraq – that it was all a massive lie calculated to start a
war. Even setting aside such claims, what does such an enormous blunder
say about the state and the competence of its agents? Not six months
before the war, Washington’s best intelligence estimate got every
important point not just wrong, but astonishingly so. If government has
any purpose, it is national defence. If it can fail so very
spectacularly in assessing threats, how can it possibly keep us safe
from them? Who among us would return to a restaurant that had botched
our order this badly? And yet the CIA director who insisted he had a
“slam dunk” case that Iraq had WMDs received the
Medal of Freedom, while
Washington’s intelligence apparatus continues its work unmolested.
Lesson #2: Social Engineering
Doesn’t Work
“Iraqi democracy will succeed, and
that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to Tehran, that
freedom can be the future of every nation.” — President George W. Bush,
November 6, 2003
After infamously proclaiming “Mission
Accomplished,” the
occupation forces turned their attention to replacing the ousted regime.
Military administration and a series of provisional governments
eventually led in 2006 to the installation of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki,
who has remained entrenched ever since. To be sure, there have been no
fewer than three national votes since the invasion:
two
parliamentary
elections and a
constitutional referendum, all of which have been at least arguably
fair and transparent.
But is Iraq a democracy? Is it a free country? Is it at least on the
way? By the extremely undemanding standards of its recent past, there
has been some improvement: the last “vote” shortly before the invasion
saw
Saddam Hussein returned to power by a 100% margin, with a 100%
turnout. And pre-war Iraq was one of the very worst human rights
violators on the planet. But in absolute terms, Iraq remains nothing
like the country that George W. Bush promised would inspire the region
and strike fear in the hearts of autocrats.
On the political front, Freedom House, a think tank linked to the US
State Department, still rates Iraq “Not
Free,” with only a
marginal improvement in its “freedom score” since 2003. It states
bluntly that “Iraq is not an electoral democracy. Although it has
conducted meaningful elections, political participation and
decision-making in the country remain seriously impaired by sectarian
and insurgent violence, widespread corruption, and the influence of
foreign powers.” (Indeed,
Transparency International ranks Iraq as the eighth-most corrupt
country on Earth.) The Economist Intelligence Unit’s “Democracy
Index” ranks Iraq 112th
out of 167 countries, just outside the “Authoritarian Regimes” category
and with a rock-bottom 0.43/10 score for the functioning of government.
As for individual liberties, in 2006 the UN Special Rapporteur on
Torture asserted that “the situation is so bad many people say it is
worse than it has been in the times of Saddam Hussein.” More recently,
in 2012,
Human Rights Watch reported that “human rights conditions in Iraq
remained extremely poor, especially for journalists, detainees, and
opposition activists” and that “reports continued of torture of
detainees unlawfully held outside the custody of the Justice Ministry.”
It added that “Iraq remained one of the most dangerous countries in the
world to work as a journalist,” revealed a secret prison operating under
the Prime Minister’s authority and referred to detainees in other
facilities being “tortured with impunity.” Violence against women,
including “honour” crimes, remained a major problem.
Amnesty International’s most recent account tells much the same
story.
While democratizing Iraq was never going to be easy, the Coalition
Provisional Authority made two early, monumental blunders, the
foolishness of which were fully apparent in real time:
Order No. 1, which
deposed any officials who were senior members of the ruling Ba’ath
Party, and
Order No. 2, which
dissolved the Iraqi military. The first effectively contributed to the
post-invasion chaos by
excluding roughly 65,000 experienced administrators from government,
and created a large, well-connected constituency for anti-occupation
sentiment. As a recent analysis of de-Ba’athification
noted, “It is unsurprising that the process became a significant
contributing factor in widespread social and political conflict.”
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“If the invasion of Iraq was
not a war of aggression, then the concept is devoid of all
meaning.” |
While de-Ba’athification was at least sensible in theory, the second
mistake was sheer lunacy. If there is one thing that we know
about post-conflict reconstruction, it is to avoid having
hundreds of thousands of unemployed, armed young men with military
training – not to create them. In the litany of decisions taken in
connection with the Iraq War, each seemingly madder than the last, this
was truly the maddest of them all.
The utter failure of post-war Iraq to live up to the promises made at
the outset of the conflict should give more than a little pause to
anyone who believes in the state’s ability to mould society into
something different from what its individual members wish it to be.
Granted, the mistakes made in the occupation’s early days were
impressive even by government standards, and the brute violence employed
in Iraq makes it a particularly stark example of failed social
engineering, but no matter how benignly packaged, the state’s efforts to
direct the course of society rarely end well.
Lesson #3: Unintended Consequences
Matter
“Not only is America safer, the
region is safer and the Iraqi people free, but the Middle East will be
more peaceful and more stable.” — White House Spokesman Scott McClellan,
July 16, 2003
The invasion’s salutary effects were to go beyond Iraq’s borders: the
entire region – nay, the world! – would benefit. Baghdad would enter
Washington’s orbit, undermining anti-Western sentiment. Americans would
live in safety, as Al-Qaeda’s appeal weakened and terrorists found fewer
and fewer recruits. The region’s citizens would cry out for democracy.
How grand were President Bush’s ambitions? Shortly before the war,
he declared, “I truly believe out of this will come peace between
Israel and the Palestinians.”
As of press time, those predictions have not exactly panned out. Last
year, the Iraqi prime minister welcomed ties with all countries of the
world –
save Israel. The past
10 years have seen revolutions sweep the Middle East, Syria descend into
civil war, two major Israeli military incursions into the Hamas-governed
Gaza Strip, and war between Jerusalem and Beirut. Middle East peace
appears not to be just around the corner. On the bright side, the former
enmity between Baghdad and Tehran
has been replaced by economic and diplomatic links, no doubt to
Washington’s great delight.
What of the war’s influence on local public opinion? As the war
approached,
solid majorities in several Arab countries had very unfavourable
views of the US and believed that the war would lead to more terrorism,
less democracy and less peace.
By 2006, 57% in six
major Arab states had a very unfavourable view of America; only 12% were
even somewhat favourable and 37% named Bush as their most-hated world
leader (more than triple the score of the Israeli prime minister). Since
the war,
these figures improved after Barack Obama’s election, then plummeted
once more before again rising after the Arab Spring – clearly despite
the invasion, not because of it.
As for those who suffered the consequences of war – the Iraqis
themselves –
early
polls indicated support for the war and optimism about the future.
After all, a tyrant had been deposed and everything seemed possible. By
2005, as violence spread, 82% of Iraqis strongly opposed the presence of
foreign troops and two-thirds felt less safe
under the occupation.
Over the coming years, Iraqis continued to become increasingly negative
about their own situation and future prospects, as well as those of the
country
as a whole.
By 2011, two in three
Iraqis still felt no better off than before the war and held a negative
view of the United States. Asked about nine separate areas of their
lives, they reported that not a single one has shown improvement since
the war. And almost half believe that political freedom has
diminished.
To top it off, far from making Americans safer, the war has only
exacerbated the terrorist threat. According to a
2006 US intelligence report,
“the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and
operatives” and attracting donors to al-Qaeda. It added, “The Iraq
conflict has become the ‘cause celebre’ for jihadists, breeding a deep
resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating
supporters for the global jihadist movement.” One official described the
report as “stating
the obvious.” A year
later,
one analysis found that the war had increased worldwide terrorist
attacks by over 600%.
The Americans may not have wanted any of this to happen, but it did all
the same. While nothing spirals out of control quite like a war, the
contrast between stated intentions and actual results reminds us that no
group of people has sufficient wisdom, power or knowledge to orchestrate
precise social change. Politicians and bureaucrats, like the rest of us,
can control only their own behaviour. They can neither know nor direct
what happens in response.
Lesson #4: Whither the Rule of
Law?
“To initiate a war of aggression,
therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme
international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it
contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”
“The law includes, and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must
condemn, aggression by any other nations, including those which sit here
now in judgment.” — Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson, Nuremburg Tribunal,
1946
If the invasion of Iraq was not a
war of aggression, then the concept is devoid of all meaning. By 2003,
eight years of war with Iran, an invasion by the broadest coalition ever
assembled and more than a decade of crippling (and
lethal) sanctions had left the regime broken, weak and a threat to
no one other than its own population. And yet here it was, facing
invasion by a country whose military budget was
twenty
times Iraq’s
entire GDP and that commanded the most advanced military force on
Earth – a country that Saddam Hussein could not possibly have harmed, no
matter how much he no doubt wished to.
The solemn pronouncements made in the aftermath of World War II have
proven meaningless. It is an absolute certainty that George W. Bush,
Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Tony Blair and the other architects of
this manifestly illegal war will never face a judicial reckoning. They
will never answer for what they have done: not to the taxpayers from
whom
trillions of dollars have been seized to pay for this madness, not
to the soldiers and their families
whose lives have been destroyed,
but above all not to the Iraqis themselves. We will never know exactly
how many
hundreds of
thousands have died, or just how much suffering has been inflicted
on the still-living, but the toll is undeniably grim.
A world in which the “supreme international crime” goes unpunished is
not one that values the rule of law. It is a world in which might makes
right and where the watchword is power, not justice. And it is a world
that should deeply trouble anyone who believes in freedom, limited
government and peace, for without the rule of law none of those things
is possible.
Have We Learned Anything?
“The United States will do what we
must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.” — President
Barack Obama, September 25, 2012
Perhaps, in some cases, history repeats itself first as tragedy, then as
farce. But another invasion and occupation of a country that poses no
threat to the US would be anything but farcical. It would merely
compound the tragedy of war with that of ignoring our collective
experience. Are we ready to embark on another tragic misadventure? Or
have we absorbed the crucial lessons that the past decade taught us
after exacting so terrible a price? Time will tell.
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